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FOREWORD 
This Col labora t ive  Paper i s  one of a series embodying t h e  
outcome of a workshop and conference on Economic S t r u c t u r a l  
Change: Analyt ica l  I s sues ,  held a t  I I A S A  i n  J u l y  and August 
1983. The conference and workshop formed p a r t  of t h e  con- 
t i nu ing  I I A S A  program on Pa t t e rn s  of Economic S t r u c t u r a l  Change 
and I n d u s t r i a l  Adjustment . 
S t r u c t u r a l  change was i n t e r p r e t e d  very broadly: t h e  t o p i c s  
covered included t h e  na tu re  and causes of changes i n  d i f f e r e n t  
s e c t o r s  of t h e  world economy, t h e  r e l a t i o n s h i p  between i n t e r -  
na t i ona l  markets and n a t i o n a l  economies, and i s s u e s  of organi- 
za t ion  and incen t ives  i n  l a r g e  economic systems. 
There i s  a genera l  consensus t h a t  important economic 
s t r u c t u r a l  changes a r e  occurring i n  t h e  world economy. There 
a r e ,  however, s eve ra l  a l t e r n a t i v e  approaches t o  measuring t he se  
changes, t o  modeling t h e  process,  and t o  devis ing appropr ia te  
responses i n  terms of po l icy  measures and i n s t i t u t i o n a l  re- 
design. Other i n t e r e s t i n g  ques t ions  concern t h e  r o l e  of t h e  
i n t e r n a t i o n a l  economic system i n  t r ansmi t t i ng  such changes, and 
t h e  m e r i t s  of a l t e r n a t i v e  modes of economic organizat ion i n  
responding t o  s t r u c t u r a l  change. A l l  of these  i s s u e s  w e r e  
addressed by p a r t i c i p a n t s  i n  t h e  workshop and conference, and 
w i l l  be t h e  focus of t h e  cont inuat ion of t h e  research  program's 
work. 
Geoffrey Heal 
Anatol i  Smyshlyaev 
Ern6 Zala i  
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EXCHANGE RATE DETERMINATION AND CURRENCY SUBSTITUTION: 
MICRO ANALYSIS AND MACRO IMPLICATIONS* 
1. Introduction 
The purposes of this essay are threefold: first, to provide a 
microtheoretic framework that incorporates the transaction motive for 
holding money in a multicurrency world; second, to show how the recent 
"currency substitution theory" can be imbedded in the micro choice model 
we develop; third, to derive some comparative static results from a 
macro model that allows agents to hold different currencies. 
Recently, Cuddington [I9821 noted in a paper discussing the issue of 
currency substitution that we still lack an explicit microtheoretic 
framework clarifying the transaction roles of different currencies in a 
multicurrency world. Tobin [I9821 also seems to call for an analysis of 
the service yields of different currencies. The next section discusses 
what properties a transaction technology describing the transaction 
roles of currencies should satisfy. Section 3.1 then formalizes the 
individual choice problem that determines the demand for the various 
currencies. 
* 
By Caspar G. de Vries, Erasmus Universiteit Rotterdam, Postbus 1738, 
3000 DR Rotterdam, The Netherlands. 
The second part of section 3 describes how the currency substitution 
literature is related to our model. Several results on currency 
substitution are shown to be nested hypotheses of our general model. 
A short-run general equilibrium model for two open economies is 
developed in the fourth section in order to derive some implications in 
the presence of currency substitution. The way in which expectations are 
introduced into the model can be desrcibed as a form of bounded 
rationality. The exchange rate in the model has the feature that it is 
an element of the price to holders of one currency of every asset and 
commodity denominated in the other currency. 
In the last section we investigate the issue of currency substitution 
on a macro level. By comparing comparative static results for economies 
with and without currency substitution present, we are able to analyze 
the qualitative and quantitative aspects of currency substitution. 
Mathematics is relegated to the appendices, together with a list of 
symbols. 
2. The Transaction Technology 
The purpose of this section is to discuss a transaction technology, 
which rationalizes agents' decisions to hold money as a way of 
economizing on the time spent in completing transactions. We start with 
an overview of the literature. 
Patinkin's [1965, p.821 argument for including money in the utility 
function is the nonsynchronization between payments and receipts. This, 
however, implies that full monetization is implicitly assumed. Wallace 
[1980, p.491 dismisses the approach because the inclusion of money in 
the utility function begs too many questions. For example: "What if 
there are several fiat moneys, those of different countries?" Wallace +. 
argues that some kind of friction has to be introduced to give fiat 
money value, and uses the intergenerational friction of the overlapping 
generations models. Another type of friction is the Clower [I9671 
constraint: "Only money buys goods." But as Hahn [1982, p.201 argues: 
"It assumes what should be explained." 
Still another kind of friction stems from the transaction technology 
prevalent in the economy. Gale's [I9821 basic assumption is that agents 
are not trust-worthy, and therefore quid pro quo characterizes each 
transaction. In such a sequence economy agents have to satisfy their 
budget constraints all the time, and this can be achieved more 
efficiently by using assets than by balancing with commodities only. The 
second assumption is that money has the least informational cost for 
enquiring into its future value, completing the argument for the 
positive value of money. The main argument in Alchian [I9771 is that the 
costs of identifying qualities of a good determine wich good will be 
used as a money. Ignorance of qualities of goods will provoke efforts to 
reduce that ignorance in order to achieve more trade. In Alchian's 
words: "If some good were sufficiently and most cheaply identifiable so 
that everyone were like an expert in it, the cost of exchanging that 
good for any other good would be less than if a more costly to identify 
good were offered, and it will become a money." In Jones' article [I9671 
individuals try to minimize the time involved in transactions by 
minimizing the expected number of encounters to fulfill their trading 
plans. Jones gives a condition when indirect trade can effect the 
ul t imate  exchange i n  fewer expected encounters than can d i r e c t  t rade.  
The argument is then t h a t  i n d i r e c t  t rade  by using the  most prevalent  
commodity saves t r ansac t ion  time i n  an exchange economy. 
I n  our view these arguments can be reconciled a s  follows. The 
opportunity c o s t s  of enquir ing i n t o  the  t rus twor th iness  of an agent and 
the  fu tu re  value of a s s e t s  is the  l e i s u r e  t i m e  foregone. S imi la r i ly ,  one 
has t o  inves t  time i n  examining the  q u a l i t i e s  of a good. Las t ly ,  Jones' 
argument is d i r e c t l y  based on the  t i m e  saved by using money. Hence, we 
take it t h a t  an e s s e n t i a l  f e a t u r e  of money is t h a t  it enables agents t o  
reduce t h e i r  t i m e  spent on completing t ransact ions .  For a c l e a r  account 
of t h i s  point  of view, see  Clower [1969]. 
I f  there  is more than one currency we have t o  explain how agents 
choose t h e i r  currency mix. We w i l l  develop a t r ansac t ion  technology t h a t  
explains the  demand f o r  d i f f e r e n t  currencies based on the  time-saving 
value of money. We requ i re  the  t ransact ion  technology t o  exh ib i t  the  
following proper t ies :  
1. Foreign currencies  a r e  held domestically t o  f a c i l i t a t e  i n t e r n a t i o n a l  
t ransact ions .  This l i n e  of thought has been developed by Swoboda 
[1968], based on the  inventory argument f o r  holding money. 
2. Money is l i k e  a language. To see  what we mean by t h i s ,  we quote from 
Tobin [1980, p.861: "Another time-honored observation of monetary 
economists is the analogy of money and language. Both a r e  means of 
communication. The use of a p a r t i c u l a r  language o r  a p a r t i c u l a r  money 
by one individual  increases  i t s  value t o  o ther  a c t u a l  o r  p o t e n t i a l  
users.  Increasing re tu rns  t o  sca le ,  i n  t h i s  sense, l i m i t s  the  number 
of languages or  moneys i n  a society..." I f  one currency is much more 
commonly used than another currency at a certain date and place, then 
invoking Jones' and Tobin's arguments, the one currency will be the 
principal one trough which an agent can reduce his transaction-time 
costs. On the other hand, if another currency is the more prevalent 
then the roles of the currencies should be the reverse. In cases 
where both currencies are widely used their usefulness should be 
equal. 
3. Differences in transaction technologies between countries can arise 
out of man-made constraints. For example, a government could require 
that taxes be paid in the national currency. This is then a kind of 
Clower constraint. 
4. In priniciple, any currency should be able to fulfill a transactions 
role as well as any other currency. This has been argued for example 
by Hayek [I9761 and is the subject of the recent currency 
substitution literature. Thus, the transaction technology should 
allow for changes in the habits discussed under property 2. 
5 .  The resulting demand functions for money should exhibit the usual 
homogeneity properties. 
6. We will require that holding more of a currency reduces the time 
involved in accomplishing transactions, but does so at a diminishing 
rate. Moreover, money is not essential in that the derived marginal 
utility from holding money does not go to infinity if no stock of 
money is held, i.e. if one engages in pure barter. 
There are a few examples in the literature that use such a 
transaction technology if only one currency is present. See for example 
Arrow and Hahn [1971, chapter 141, McCallum [1982], and Greenwood 
[1983]. A model of this type, in which more than one currency is held, 
is presented in the next section. 
3. Micro Choices and Currency Substitution 
3.1. The individual's choice problem 
We start with a description of the economic setting in which the 
individual takes his decisions. The world consists of two countries, 
which produce two commodities, and each country's government supplies a 
national currency and a bond. Divide time up in discrete periods, which 
will be referred to as Hicksian weeks. Imagine that at the beginning of 
such a Hicksian week, prices are established in auctioneer markets and 
contracts for delivery are finalized. During the rest of the week, 
output is generated and deliveries are made. To settle transactions, 
agents will hold cash balances. We would like to give a summary account 
of the individual's economic behavior during the Hicksian week. To make 
such a description possible, we assume that an agent maximizes a utility 
function subject to his budget constraint. The individual's present 
choices are influenced by his expectations about the future state of the 
economy. In particular, expectations will influence the agent's demand 
for assets. Assume that the agent's capability of looking forward is 
limited to a finite number of weeks; for simplicity, we take the 
planning horizon to be one week. For the coming week the agent perceives 
different states of nature to be possible, and attaches some probability 
to the occurrence of each state. 
A precise description of the individual's choice problem is as 
follows. The individual maximizes his intertemporally separable utility 
function subject to some restraints. All prices and income are known to 
the individual for the first period, but when planning for the second 
period these variables are still unknown. It is assumed, however, that 
the individual perceives a set of possible future states of the world, 
to the occurrence of which he attaches a subjective probability measure. 
The individual plans for the second period by maximizing his expected 
utility function. Arguments of the utility function are the consumption 
levels of the two commodities x and z ,  and the available leisure time. 
Assuming that the wage rate and labor hours are fixed, the individual 
divides his leftover time t between conducting transactions and leisure. 
Transactions are facilitated by the use of money and thus leisure time 
can be increased by holding more money. The transaction technology s(.) 
models the exchange frictions. It indicates the time used in completing 
transactions as a function of the domestic currency m and the foreign 
currency 1, as well as some variables representing payment habits h. A 
price index n = n [p,q], satisfying the axioms discussed in Eichhorn 
[1978, p.1531, such as homogeneity of degree one in p and q, is used to 
deflate money holdings. The budget constraints are denoted in the 
domestic currency, and e represents the exchange rate measured as the 
cost of the foreign currency. The agent's fixed wage income is denoted 
by y. Government taxes or subsidies to the individual are denoted by g. 
The individual can hold domestic or foreign bonds b and d with rates of 
return (r-1) and (i-1) respectively, so that, for example, one plus the 
domestic interest rate equals r. The individual's pure rate of time 
preference is indicated by the factor p, where 1 > p > 0. Forward 
exchange purchases k  can be made agains t  the  forward r a t e  f .  Possible 
c a p i t a l  market r e s t r i c t i o n s  a r e  modelled by l imi t ing  individual  
purchases of fore ign bonds up t o  the  amount i. Si tua t ions  i n  which 
forward markets a r e  absent can be studied by s e t t i n g  k  equal t o  zero. 
The s t a t e s  of the  world a r e  indicated by j, and each s t a t e  has 
p robab i l i ty  n ( j ) ,  Ljn( j )  = 1. The t i m e  dimension of a  va r i ab le  is 
indica ted  between parentheses following the  var iable .  The previous 
period is  indica ted  by ( - I ) ,  the  present-period va r i ab les  do not car ry  a  
t i m e  i nd ica to r ,  and the  contingent fu tu re  va r i ab les  a r e  indica ted  
by ( j ) .  
Formally, the  individual ' s  choice problem may be expressed as :  
(1 )  maximize: 
where 
W[.l I PU[-] ,  with 1  > p > 0, n  = n[p ,q l ,  and s ( . )  < t ,  s V ( . )  < 0, 
subjec t  to: 
and 
(3) y(j) + m + e(j)l + rb + e( j)id + e( j)k - fk - g( j) - p(j)x(j) 
- q(j>z( j) - m(j> - e( j)l( j) > 0, for all j = 1,2,. . . ,n 
and if relevant, the capital market constraint 
Somewhat similar choice problems have been discussed in the 
literature. The reader might consult, for example, the articles by 
Stockman [1978, 19801 or the paper by Stulz 119821. In contrast with our 
setup, Stockman models the demand for money by way of Clower 
constraints. A major difference between Stulz' approach and ours is that 
Stulz assumes "... individuals produce consumption, using commodities, 
cash balances and labor as inputs." In this case a function of x, m and 
el would enter the utility function as the argument for the consumption 
of x. However, in this approach it is not clear how money is used for 
settling transactions in bonds. 
The necessary first-order conditions for the optimization problem are 
relegated to Appendix A, but some are stated here because we make 
repeated use of them below (see Appendix A eqns. (A3) - (A8)): 
( l o )  wx( j )  - X(j )p( j>  G 0, f o r  a l l  j, 
where 5 ,  X(j) and $ a r e  the  Lagrange mul t ip l i e r s  f o r  the  cons t ra in t s  
(2 ) ,  (3) and (4). In  the  following discussion we assume tha t  the 
solut ion of the optimization problem is such t ha t  the demand f o r  a l l  
goods is posi t ive ,  unless e x p l i c i t l y  s t a ted  t o  the  contrary. 
With unres t r i c ted  c a p i t a l  markets, the above condit ions can be 
manipulated to  a r r i v e  a t  the  i n t e r e s t  pa r i t y  condit ion f / e  = r/i. 
If  the i n t e r e s t  p a r i t y  condition does not hold i n  the  market, suppose 
f o r  example tha t  f / e  > r/i ,  then no domestic bonds a r e  demanded. The 
reason is, t h a t  the  individual  can make gains through r i s k l e s s  
arbitrage.  With f r e e  c a p i t a l  markets, a deviat ion from the i n t e r e s t  
pa r i t y  wi l l  be exploited by individuals and can therefore  be expected t o  
evaporate rapidly. However, i f  individuals a r e  res t ra ined i n  t h e i r  
purchases of foreign bonds, f / e  > r / i  can be compatible with the  
indivual ' s  choice. With c a p i t a l  market r e s t r i c t i o n s  present i n  the  form 
of an individual  quota on foreign bonds, we der ive  from the above 
condit ions tha t  f / e  = ( l++/Se)  r/i. The forward premium d i f f e r s  from the  
i n t e r e s t  r a t e  d i f f e r e n t i a l  by a fac to r  $/Sea The r a t i o  $15 gives the 
marginal change i n  present income due t o  a marginal change i n  the quota 
on foreign bonds. 
The forward r a t e  f can be expressed a s  the sum of three  tenns. To do 
t h i s ,  note tha t  the expected future  exchange r a t e  is  
:~[e(j)] = Za(j)e(j), and that by using (10) the forward rate is given by 
where p*(j) = p(j)/e(j), i.e. the foreign price of x(j). Hence 
The forward exchange rate equals the sum of the expected future exchange 
rate E[e(j)] plus a risk premium a and a convexity term o. 
The risk premium a stems from exchange rate uncertainty. Note that a is 
zero if e( j) = e(1) for all j states, i.e. there is no exchange rate 
risk; but it is nonzero in general if p(j) = p(1) for all j states, i.e. 
if there is no domestic commodity price risk. The convexity term o can 
be viewed as a risk premium for domestic commodity price uncertainty; it 
is zero if p( j) = p(1) for all j states. Unlike the risk premium a, the 
convexity term o does not depend on people's attitudes toward risk. In 
case p(j) has positive variance o is nonzero due to Jensen's inequality. 
The convexity term is also zero in the absence of exchange rate 
uncertainty. 
The marginal rate of substitution between the foreign and the 
domestic currency can now be expressed in four different ways 
With unres t r i c t ed  c a p i t a l  markets, the opportunity l o s s  i n  a l l o c a t i n g  a 
u n i t  of income t o  the  holding of the domestic currency ins tead  of bonds 
is the  i n t e r e s t  (r-1) foregone. The opportunity l o s s  i n  a l l o c a t i n g  a 
u n i t  of income t o  the holding of the  fore ign currency ins tead  of fore ign 
bonds is the  fo re ign  i n t e r e s t  (i-1) foregone t i m e s  the  c a p i t a l  ga in  f / e  
induced by currency revaluat ions  ( see  (11)) .  This l a t t e r  c a p i t a l  ga in  is 
t i e d  t o  the  i n t e r e s t  r a t e  by the i n t e r e s t  p a r i t y  condit ion (12). The 
t h i r d  i n t e r p r e t a t i o n  (13) exh ib i t s  the individual ' s  evaluat ion  of the 
c o s t s  he a s soc ia tes  with the  el imination of exchange r i s k  through 
forward sa les .  S t i l l  another i n t e r p r e t a t i o n  is given by (14). The 
numerator i n  (14) most c l e a r l y  exh ib i t s  the opportunity cos t s  of holding 
t h e  fore ign currency. The opportunity l o s s  equals  the domestic r a t e  of 
i n t e r e s t  foregone minus the  forward premium ( o r ,  plus the  forward 
discount) .  
When the  c a p i t a l  market r e s t r i c t i o n  is binding, (11) becomes 
It was shown above t h a t  i n  the  case  of imperfect c a p i t a l  markets 
f/e > r/i. Thus when trade in foreign assets is limited, the opportunity 
loss from holding the foreign currency relative to the domestic currency 
declines. This leads to a substitution of the foreign currency for the 
domestic currency. Stated differently, if one is unable to purchase and 
hold all the intended foreign interest bearing assets, one partially 
compensates for this restriction by holding more of the foreign 
currency, because in this way the capital gain due to currency 
revaluations can still be made. Note that (14) still holds, but, given 
the two interest rates, the forward premium (f/e-1) has risen due to the 
quota on foreign bonds. 
To arrive at our next result, recall the way in which cash balances 
enter the agent's utility function. Only the two commodities x and z and 
leisure time u are arguments of the utility function. But, part of the 
leisure time has to be used for completing transactions due to exchange 
frictions. The individual is therefore left with an amount of leisure 
time u 0 t-s(.). Cash balances are arguments of s(.) because they smooth 
the exchange process. The marginal utility of holding m can therefore be 
expressed as Umln 0 - UUsm/,. Hence, the marginal rate of substitution 
between the foreign and domestic currency in the presence of perfect 
capital markets (12) can be written simply as 
The only two choice variables that are arguments of the function s(.) 
are the two currencies m and 1. This leads to the following conclusion. 
The way in which the two currencies m and 1 are optimally combined in 
the  presence of perfec t  c a p i t a l  markets does not  depend on the  
individual ' s  t a s t e s ,  and p a r t i c u l a r l y  not on h i s  a t t i t u d e s  towards r isk.  
The optimal combination of m and 1 is dic ta ted  by the  t r ansac t ion  
technology of the economy and the i n t e r e s t  ra tes .  For somewhat s imi lar  
r e s u l t s ,  see Fama and Farber [I9791 and Stulz [1982]. The reason we can 
write the marginal r a t e  of subs t i tu t ion  between m and 1 a s  i n  (12') is 
the f a c t  t h a t  m and 1 a r e  i n  a sepera te  branch of the  u t i l i t y  tree. (See 
S t r o t z  [I9571 f o r  a discussion of these concepts.) The reason the  r ight-  
hand s i d e s  i n  (12) and (12') can be s t a ted  s o l e l y  i n  terms of i n t e r e s t  
r a t e s  is t h a t  the  bond markets a r e  perfect .  Were the  bond markets and 
forward market absent o r  imperfect,  the right-hand s i d e  i n  (12') would 
s t i l l  depend on the  present  and fu tu re  marginal u t i l i t i e s  of income. 
This, i n  its turn ,  would imply t h a t  the optimal combination of the two 
currencies depends on the  r i s k  assessment of the  individual .  
In  the  case  where no fore ign bonds can be bought or  held and forward 
purchases a r e  not poss ib le  e i t h e r ,  we can der ive  a s p e c i f i c  condit ion 
f o r  currency s u b s t i t u t i o n  t o  occur. Assume t h a t  the two currencies a r e  
pe r fec t ly  s u b s t i t u t a b l e  f o r  t ransact ion purposes. In  t h i s  case the  
function s( .)  takes the  s p e c i f i c  form s(.) = s (m/nk l /n ,  h) ,  so  t h a t  
se l /n  ' Sm/n* Divide (5) and ( 6 ) ,  and f ind eCX(j)r( j)  = C X ( j ) ~ ( j ) e ( j ) .  
Suppose t h a t  the s o l e  cause of uncer ta in ty  is the exchange r a t e  r isk.  I n  
t h i s  case the  condit ion f o r  d i v e r s i f i c a t i o n  between the  currencies  a t  
the  point where no fore ign currency is held i n i t i a l l y ,  is 
F.lr(j)e(j) > e. This is e s s e n t i a l l y  Arrow's proposit ion [1974, p. 1001 , 
t h a t  a r i s k  a v e r t e r  always takes some par t  of a favourable bet. 
3.2. A transaction technology example and relations with previous work. 
The question we address here is whether the above micro model 
provides a unifying framework for the currency substitution literature. 
The articles by Girton and Roper [I9811 and Miles [I9781 are taken as 
examples, and we show that, if we choose the appropriate transaction 
technology, our model corresponds to those of Girton and Roper, and of 
Miles . 
To specify our example transaction technology we define the following 
functions 
(15) s - s(c), with domain c > 0, range t > s(c) > 0, and derivatives 
s'(c) < 0 and sw(c) > 0, 
where all a's as well as M(-11, W(-l), L(-11, L*(-l), N(-l), 
and N*(-l), are positive, and 
Substitution of all these functions into (15) gives the proposed 
transaction technology; and some further discussion of it is in order at 
this point. 
Property 6 defined in the previous section is reflected by s'(c) < 0, 
sW(c) > 0, and t > s(c) > 0, i.e. s is a convex and bounded function on 
R+. Because t > s(c), the amount of leisure time u left, u = t - s(c), 
is always positive. This implies that the derived marginal utility of 
money is always finite. The CES function-in (16) is chosen because of 
the two particular articles we have chosen to discuss. Parameters r, 
gm, and g1 represent payment habits h. The parameter r will be seen to 
define, in a certain sense, the elasticity of currency substitution a. 
In the case of imperfect substitution, i.e. - "o < r < 1, the ratio m/el 
will be relatively high if gm/gl is high. The parameters gm and g1 try 
to capture Tobin's observation that the use of a particular currency by 
one individual increases its value to other actual or potential users; 
see property 2 defined above. This is done by means of the gravity 
equations (17) and (18). Let the total of domestically held stocks of 
currencies m and 1 in the previous period be denoted by M(-1) and L(-1), 
respectively, while abroad these stocks are indicated by @(-I) and 
L*(-1). The transaction usefulness of the real stock of, say, currency m 
held by an individual, will be high if it represents a readily accepted 
means of payment; this in turn will presumably be so if the total real 
stock of currency m in the economy is high relative to the total real 
stock of 1, and vice versa. Moreover, we have included the size of 
population in the two countries, N and P, as factors that may possibly 
1 influence gm and g . We assume that the agent has only past observations 
available on these aggregate variables, and therefore we lag them by one 
period. Above we assumed all M(-1), @(-l), L(-1), and L*(-1) to be 
1 positive in the definition of gm and g . If, for example, currency m is 
not held abroad, but 1 is, i.e. the asymmetric country assumption, then 
we define gm and g1 as in (17) and (18) but omit the factors 
a 
-4 (EF(-l)/n) 2and (@(-l)/n) . Inspecting equations (17) and (18), we 
see that the roles of the two currencies can be reversed symmetrically, 
so property 4 is satisfied. Moreover, payment patterns and thus gm and 
1 g can change, because currency holdings change due to expectations as 
outlined in the micro optimization model. The homogeneity properties of 
this technology are easily established, i.e. property 5 is satisfied. 
The transaction technology defined by (15) - (18) allows for the 
usefulness of the foreign currency, and thus property 1 is satisfied. 
The marginal rate of substitution between the foreign and domestic 
currency is, for this specific example, 
Define the elasticity of currency substitution, given perfect capital 
markets, as 
This corroborates Miles' [I9781 result. However, in our view, when 
measuring the opportunity costs of holding the foreign currency, account 
should also be taken of the forward premium. Therefore, the foreign 
interest rate (i-1) is multiplied by the factor f/e to measure capital 
gains through currency revaluations. Moreover, we have shown how this 
elasticity derives from a full-fledged theory of individual choice. 
In the case where cash balances are measured as demand deposits on 
which interest is being paid, we have to measure the opportunity costs 
1 a s  follows. Let ( 1 - p )  and (1-r ) be i n t e r e s t  r a t e s  being paid on 
domestic and fore ign demand deposi ts ,  respectively.  Then the right-hand 
s ide  of (11) becomes 
1 
'el/n ( i - r  ) f / e  (11') - = 
'm/ n ( r-rm) 
Take logarithms of the  above marginali ty condit ion (19) t o  obta in  
m 
(21) l n e  - I++ u[ln(i-1) - ln(r-1) + 1$] + ul*. 
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This expression corresponds c lose ly  t o  the basic equation (8) i n  Girton 
and Roper [1981]. We i n t e r p r e t e  h ( i - 1 )  - ln(r-1) a s  the nominal 
i n t e r e s t  r a t e  d i f f e r e n t i a l  used by Girton and Roper. Secondly, l n ( r / i )  
can be in te rp re ted  as an approximation f o r  the ant ic ipated  r a t e  of 
change i n  the  exchange r a t e ,  because by the  i n t e r e s t  p a r i t y  condit ion 
r = f e  As eqn. (19) lends i t s e l f  t o  aggregation i f  the r a t i o  gm/gl 
i s  i d e n t i c a l  f o r  a l l  individuals ,  m and 1 can be in te rp re ted  a s  
aggregate currency demands. One must be ca re fu l ,  however, not t o  deduce 
any causal  macro re la t ionsh ip  from eqn. (21). It only ind ica tes  how m 
and 1 should be optimally combined. I n  the aggregate both e, r and i a r e  
determined simultaneously. This w i l l  be shown i n  the next sect ion.  
However, t h i s  f a c t  was somewhat obscured i n  the  presentat ion of Girton 
and Roper. 
Girton and Roper a r r i v e  a t  an equation l i k e  (21) by combining 
LM equations f o r  the domestic and foreign currency. But the exchange 
r a t e  e i s  not  an argument of t h e i r  W s c h e d u l e s ,  whereas i n  our theory 
it would be; and the exchange r a t e  is merely determined by the two 
LM schedules. This leads Girton and Roper to conclude that any exchange 
rate is an equilibrium rate when substitution is perfect, see Girton and 
Roper [1981, p.161. Their argument is as follows: if u = - -, then for 
e to be finite in (21), it is neccessary that r = i and g1 = gm. Assume 
this to be the case. Thus we get from (21) lne = ln(m/l). Because of - 
perfect substitutability however, m and 1 are not determinate 
themselves, and therefore e can take on any value. Note now that we 
could never have derived eqn. (21) in the case where u = - O ,  because 
the marginality condition (19) reduces in this case to gl/gm = 
(1-l/i)/(l-l/r). Whether e is determinate or not has still to be settled 
for our model. One finds indeed that only the sum m + el is determinate 
with perfect capital markets and perfect substitutability. However, - if 
capital markets are imperfect, because of, say, a quota on foreign 
bonds, then m and 1 will be determinate. This can be inferred from the 
first-order conditione for the individual's optimization problem. Thus, 
even if m and 1 are perfectly substitutable from a transactions- 
facilitating point of view, their difference in risk properties renders 
them determinate in the absence of perfect capital markets. Girton and 
Roper allude to this possibility when they conjecture that "transactions 
costs," in the sense of conversion costs, would render m and 1 
determinate. One could view the quota on foreign bonds as a way of 
modeling these transactions costs. We note that m and 1 in the case of 
perfect substitutability and imperfect capital markets still depend on 
e. We conjecture that e will be determinate in an equilibrium situation 
for the whole economy. 
We are still puzzled by Girton and Roper's observation that the 
individual money demands are not defined in their model in the case of 
perfect substitutability. Inspecting their eqn. (3), it appears that the 
demand for real cash balances, M1/pl in Girton and Roper's notation,- are 
still determinate in the case of perfect substitutability. (Setting rl = 
r2, we get: M1/pl = O1(w) exp al(rl-r).) Presumably, in the case of 
imperfect substitutability real money demand is equated with real money 
supply to arrive at the LM equation (3) of Girton and Roper. This 
procedure would give us nominal balances M1, from either knowing the 
domestic price level P1 or the nominal money supply. We see no reason 
why this cannot also be done in the case of perfect substitutability. 
After all, if the currencies are perfect substitutes in all dimensions, 
then we do not expect demand theory to offer an explanation for the 
currency ratio MI/% ; but the exogenous supplies of both currencies 
would completely determine ~ ~ 1 %  . It seems that indeterminacy of e is 
indeed possible, but has to be argued in a different way. 
4. Macro Model 
4.1. Introduction 
This section sets out to develop a short-run macro model for an open 
economy with both commodity and asset markets present. In this way we 
try to combine the flow market model of exchange rate determination with 
the asset market approach. The individual whose choice problem was 
discussed in the previous section has limited foresight to the extent 
that he is able to plan one period ahead for each perceived contingency. 
In this section we assume that the individual expects, for each state of 
the world, those .prices to prevail which would clear all markets. The 
approach taken here is a form of bounded rationality; see Tobin [1982]. 
Both, flexible and fixed exchange rate regimes are discussed. Some 
comparative statics results are derived in the next section. 
4.2. Supply Side 
We assume that both countries are completely specialized in 
production. The domestic country produces total output XO and the 
foreign country produces Z', Suppose that a production function F, with 
the stock of capital K fixed, but with variable labour inputs N, is an 
adequate representation of the supply side for our short-run model. The 
functional form of F is of the neoclassical type, with implicit costs of 
adjustment of the Labor force possibly added to it. With nominal wages y 
fixed, the macro short-run production function is conveniently 
sununarized as 
(22) xO- F(K,F~~(Y/P)) 
= X'(~), and XO > 0, 
P 
We assume for simplicity that the short-run profits pX = pxO - Ny are 
retained by firms and used for investment purposes, but that these 
investments are not realized in the periods under consideration. 
Moreover, we assume that each industry uses the product of the other 
industry as in input for the investment process, This investment process 
transforms the input into physical capital, which is installed in a 
future period. We could have introduced a third sector producing 
physical capital explicitly. This, however, would not alter the analysis 
significantly but would certainly clutter up the calculations. For the 
same reason, we assume complete specialization. 
To summarize, the budget constraint of the supply side reads 
4.3. Demand Side 
Assume t h a t A l  individuals have identical preferences as defined by 
the expected utility function in the previous section. When aggregating 
individual demand functions, we have to take account of the possibility 
that these demand functions may not be identical because of differences 
in individual wealth levels. The level of individual wealth is 
m(-1) + el(-1) + r(-l)b(-1) + ei(-l)d(-1). Differences in wealth of 
individuals arise because the level of employment N is variable. 
However, it can be shown that while the magnitudes of the partial 
derivatives of the demand functions differ across individuals, the signs 
do not. It would only obscure the computation of the macro comparative 
statics and not affect the results qualitatively if we were to 
distinguish between different cohorts of agents. Therefore, we introduce 
a fictitious representative agent whose demand functions, when 
multiplied by the number employed N, give the aggregate demand 
functions. For the first period the aggregate household constraint is 
It will facilitate the discussion later on to introduce prices v and w 
for domestic and foreign bonds, respectively. These prices represent the 
premium or'discount at which the bond is sold given a fixed interest 
rate. In the previous section, the premium or discount was captured by 
the yields r and i. Throughout this section and the following section it 
is assumed that no forward markets exist. 
The next period's constraints are 
for all j states. 
4.4. Government 
The government purchases domestic..connnodities G ~ / ~  and foreign 
commodities G'/~, which are supplied to the unemployed according to some 
rationing scheme. The government can finance this by collecting taxes 
Ng, by monetary financing AM', or by the issue of bonds VB'. 
Assume that these bonds are one-period bonds. Therefore, the government 
needs to pay the rate of interest plus the principal sum on its 
outstanding bonds: r(-1)BS(-1). The government's first-period budget 
constraint reads 
The contingent second-period finnancing constraints are 
for all j states. Note that no new bond issues are foreseen. This has to 
do with the limited planning horizon of the agents, as will be explained 
below. 
4 - 5 .  Balance of Payments 
We add up the above sectoral constraints to arrive at the excess 
supply functions that make up the balance of payments. The home 
country's first-period balance of payments is 
Along the same lines, the foreign balance of payments denoted in the 
domestic prices is written as 
Because the contingent second-period balances are very similar to the 
ones presented above, they are not stated here. 
4 - 6 .  World Budget Constraints 
With flexible rates the first-period world budget constraint is found 
by adding the two countries! balances of payments: 
To keep the equations transparent, we introduce the following shorthand 
notation. Denote the domestic excess supply functions for x, z, m, 1, b, 
and d, respectively, by E'X, E'Z, E'M, E'L, E'B and ESD; a star again 
indicates the foreign variables. Using this notation, the world budget 
constraint (30) can be stated as 
By a flexible rate regime we mean that no intervention takes place. Thus 
the amounts of each currency supplied are willingly held and the supply 
of each currency is fully exogenously determined. Note that, even with 
bond markets absent, the trade balance does not necessarily equal zero 
under a flexible exchange rate system. The reason is that both 
currencies can be freely traded by all agents. 
In the case of fixed exchange rates we assume that an Exchange 
Stabilization Fund (ESF) intervenes to support the currencies; see for 
example Kemp [1962, p.3171. To see how the ESF works, suppose that it 
has bought a quantity of currency 1 with currency m. Then the ESF will 
be restocked by the domestic central bank, which prints currency m, 
through a swap of m for 1 against the fixed rate. The domestic central 
bank ends up with a decrease in its stock of m and an equivalent 
increase in its stock of foreign exchange. If, at a later stage, the ESF 
has to sell currency 1 in return for m, then it can also be restocked by 
the domestic central bank running down its stock of foreign exchange. 
With fixed rates, the supply of a currency does not necessarily equal 
the world private demand for that currency, but the activities of the 
ESF ensure that the world's private demand plus the fund's demand equal 
the supply; see Kemp [ 1962, p.3181. It follows that a decrease in one 
currency held in private hands because of intervention implies an 
increase in the other currency held in private hands by the same nominal 
amount. Denote by I the amount of currency m the ESF has to sell in 
return for currency 1 to stabilize the agreed rate. The first-period 
world budget constraint is then 
To save space, the second-period constraints are stated only in 
Appendix B. 
4.7. Excess Supply Systems 
Individual decisions in the first period depend on the agent's 
expectations with regard to the second period. We will assume that 
expectations are formed rationally in such a way that those prices are 
expected to prevail, in each state of the world, which would clear all 
markets. The full excess supply system describing the macro model 
therefore consists of the first-period excess supply functions and the 
contingent second-period excess supply functions. 
In section 4.4 we noted that agents do not foresee new bond issues 
during the second period. The reason is that with full rationality and a 
limited planning horizon, agents do not plan to demand any bonds in the 
second period. Demand for bonds is only positive in the second period if 
we introduce a third period. If we drop the assumption of rationality 
for the third period, then positive planned bond demand for the second 
period can be introduced into the macro model. However, in this case all 
the demand functions depend upon the prices expected to prevail in the 
third period. To sum up, we could introduce positive bond demand by 
assuming that price expectations are formed rationally for the second 
period, and are determined in a fuzzy way for the third period. For the 
present discussion, however, we assume full rationality because we do 
not perceive any major gain from using the other approach. 
In the first period there are six world markets for commodities x and 
z, currencies m and 1, and bonds b and d. One market equilibrium 
condition can be eliminated from the excess supply system by invoking 
Walras' law. The perceived second-period markets are those of x( j), 
z(j), m(j), and l(j); again, one market equilibrium condition can be 
eliminated for each state of the world. 
Under the fixed exchange rate regime the excess supply system that 
describes the world economy reads, for example, 
E% + E'X* " 0, 
E ~ Z  + E'Z* = 0, 
E% + E'W + I a 0, 
(33) E ~ B  + E~B* = 0, 
E% + E ~ P  = 0, 
ESx( j) + E~X*(J) = 0, for all j, 
ESz( j) + ES2*( j) = 0, for all j, 
E'M(~) + E%( j) + I( j) = 0, for all j. 
This is a system of 5 + 3n equations in the 5 + 3x1 endogenous variables 
p, q, I, v, w, p( j), q( j) and I( j), where n is the number of states of 
the world. Without international bond markets the excess supply 
functions ESB* and E'D have to be omitted. Without any bond markets the 
fourth and fifth market equilibrium conditions are abandoned. The excess 
supply system under the flexible rates regime is given in Appendix B 
eqns. (B48). Appendix B also gives the above excess supply system (33) 
expressed in the original macro demand and supply functions; see eqns. 
(B4) 
5 .  Com~arative Statics 
The macro model is now complete and by total differentiation of the 
excess supply system we can derive some comparative statics results. In 
general the totally differentiated excess supply system looks like 
where A is a square matrix with elements a representing the partial ij 
derivatives of the excess supply functions with respect to the 
- 
endogenous variables pj; p is the vector with macro endogenous variables 
pj as elements; and the vector 3 contains the partial derivatives of the 
excess supply functions with respect to the exogenous variables. To be 
able to tell in which direction an endogenous variable changes due to a 
change in an exogenous variable, one needs to know the signs of the 
determinants used when applying Cramer's rule. In the case where a 
matrix is totally stable it is a Hicksian matrix, see for example Quirk 
and Saposnik [1968, p.1661, and the sign of its determinant can be 
determined. Sufficient conditions for a matrix to be totally stable are 
that is has a positive diagonal and is quasi-dominant-diagonal; see 
Quirk and Saposnik [1968, p.1671. Fortunately, we can establish that 
some of the matrices we need are totally stable under some additional 
assumptions. For example, the diagonal elements of the matrix of the 
differentiated excess supply system with fixed exchange rates and no 
bond markets are all positive, because of the negative own price effect 
on the demand side. Moreover, the quasi-dominant-diagonal property 
follows from the homogeneity properties of the demand functions. This 
result is elaborated in Appendix B, as well as the other results we need 
to sign the determinants. 
Before we describe our results, we wish to mention two studies that 
have employed macro models similar to the one described above. Kemp's 
[I9621 article is based upon an one-period, general equilibrium model 
with domestic money markets and internationally traded commodities. As 
such, the article is a formal precursor of what later was called the 
monetary approach to the balance of payments; see Frenkel and Johnson 
[1976]. Kemp analyzed the effects of a devaluation with this model. The 
model we employ here is an extension of Kemp's model in the following 
sense: employment effects are introduced, a public sector and its budget 
constraint are taken into account, we allow for the foreign currency to 
be held domestically, and we deal explicitly with expectations with 
regard to macro endogenous variables. Using this model we study the 
phenomenon of currency substitution. 
A more recent article is that by Stockman [1980]; see also the 
discussion in section 3.1. Stockman's model is a multiperiod model that 
embodies uncertainty and expectations as in our model. Stockman is 
mainly concerned with the effects of a real shock. While reading 
Stockman's article we encountered some ambiguity in the way the 
comparative statics results are derived. Note that for derivation of 
comparative statics results, we differentiate the system of first-period 
and second-period contingent excess supply functions; see for example 
eqns. (33) and (34). The contingent second-period excess supply 
functions cannot be disregarded in the analysis because of the rational 
expectations assumption. Stockman, however, first reduces the full 
excess supply system to an excess supply system comprising only the 
first-period excess supply functions. This is done by relating the 
second-period macro endogenous variables to first-period variables. 
Then, the reduced excess supply system is differentiated totally, and 
comparative statics results are obtained. To obtain any definite 
results, additional assumptions have to be made, for example, normality 
of goods. However, from Stockman's presentation it is unclear whether 
these assumptions are also made with respect to the second-period 
variables. In particular, a partial derivative of a first-period macro 
variable with respect to one of the first-period endogenous variables, 
in the differentiated reduced excess supply system, contains indirectly 
the effects of changes in second-period endogenous variables. As shown 
in Appendix B, for example, in addition to the assumption of gross 
substitutability for goods of the same period, we also need the 
assumption of gross substitutability for goods across periods. 
The purpose of this section is to analyze the issue of currency 
substitution on a macro level. We go some way toward answering the 
questions as to what are the qualitative and quantitative differences 
between macro models with and without the possibility of currency 
subsitution. These questions will be dealt with by comparing comparative 
statics results in both circumstances. In particular, we study the 
effects of monetary financed expenditure increases by the government 
under two exchange rate regimes. 
5.1. Fixed Exchange Rates 
We start with an analysis of the fixed rates system without bond 
markets, i.e. system (33) with the fourth and fifth equations omitted. 
Before we derive any specific result, we do some preliminary work. To 
derive the comparative statics result we use Cramer's rule. For any 
qualitative conclusions we need to know the signs of the two 
determinants. The determinant of matrix A in (34) is one of those we 
need to sign, and this will be discussed first. 
Sufficient conditions for the negative of matrix A in (34) to be 
totally stable are: 
(35) commodities of the same period and across periods are gross 
substitutes, 
(36) all commodities are normal goods, 
(37) commodity price induced employment and profit effects are small in 
the short run. 
Conditions (35) and (36) are the common normality and gross 
substitutability assumptions employed to guarantee Hicksian stability. 
However, our short-run model allows for variations in the level of 
employment and profits due to fixed nominal wages and flexible commodity 
prices. Employment and profits are positively correlated with the 
commodity prices. Moreover, an increase in employment and profits 
increases the demand for commodities. Thus, there is a tendency for the 
partial market demand curves to become upward sloped. Condition (37) 
states that this tendency has to be small in a sense made precise in 
Appendix B, eqn. (B17). Conditions (35) - (37) imply that the 
determinant that appears in the denominator in application of Cramer's 
rule is positive. Next we turn to the determinant in the numerator. 
We are specifically interested in the effect of a monetary financed 
subsidy to domestic residents upon the intervention of the ESF. First, 
we derive the effects under the usual assumption that no foreign 
currencies are held domestically. Second, we show what the implications 
are if we relax this assumption. 
Given two other conditions, it turns out that the ESF is required to 
buy the home currency, supposing zero intervention initially, as a 
result of the monetary financed subsidy to domestic residents. The 
conditions are those stated above and in addition 
u - m  m (38) 
m 
and either 
(39) all price elasticities with respect to money cm are positive and 
the income elasticities with respect to money nm are positive, 
m (40) both income elasticities n: and nm are positive and 2 > nu. 
uj m 
In the above, income elasticities n t  are defined as nm = 2 n price 
u m u' 
elasticities like em are defined as em = & and the employment 
P P m P  
elasticity (N is given by ( = $Ip. The set of conditions (38) and (39) 
P P 
is elaborated in Appendix B, see (B27) and (B28). Without employment 
effects, i.e. with (N = 0, condition (38) just states that money is a 
P 
normal good, which is already taken into account in (39). Hence, with 
short-run employment effects present, one reaches again the conventional 
conclusion that I declines if the government "rolls the presses1' to 
finance its transfer increases, conditional upon the employment effect 
being small. Condition (39) can be replaced by the weaker condition (P 
(40). Condition (40) is weaker than (39) because it does not assume that 
money and all commodities are gross substitutes. By the homogeneity of 
degree one of m, see (B23), this is equivalent to allowing money to be 
a luxury good. In cases where the sum of the income elasticities 
m nu + PP exceeds one, condition (38) becomes more plausible. 
u j 
Empirically the estimates for the elasticity of the demand for money 
with respect to income tend to be larger than unity. (See Arrow 
[1974,p.103] and Intriligator [1978,p.309] for a discussion and an 
overview of studies that support this assertion.) 
With foreign currency demand present in both countries, condition 
(38) has to be modified to 
u-m m P m *  m* m* (41) 7 
The qualitative difference between (38) and (41) is the term 
m* m* N* (NLm*/Nm){l-nu* - ZnU*j + ( q}. This term also indicates the possible 
effects of currency substitution. For an interpretation, it will pay us 
to disregard for a moment the employment effects, i.e. set 
(N = (N* = 0. If money is a luxury good, i.e. we assume that (40) holds, 
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then (1 - m* 
nu* 
- Znm* ) is negative, and the conclusion that intervention 
u* j 
I on behalf of the home currency m becomes necessary is strengthened. 
However, if money is a gross substitute for all commodities, i.e. one 
relies on (39), then (41) is a stronger assumption than (38). In t h i ~  
case, if total foreign currency holdings abroad e m *  are large relative 
to the domestic holdings Nm, then the reverse of (41) might prevail 
instead. This does not necessarily imply that I increases, but neither 
can this possibility be ruled out. 
Let us summarize our conclusions obtained thus far. Assume that all 
commodities are normal goods and are gross substitutes. Moreover, 
assume the price induced employment and profit effects upon demand to be 
small. Then, under the fixed parities regime without bond markets and if 
money is a luxury good, one finds that a monetary financed subsidy to 
domestic residents makes it necessary for the ESF to intervene on behalf 
of the home currency. This result can be interpreted as a version of 
Gresham's law, in the sense that the ESF receives the "officially 
overvaluedn domestic currency in return for the "officially undervalued" 
foreign currency. The conclusion is strengthened, in the sense that one 
needs weaker conditions to obtain definite results, if one allows for 
currency substitution. However, if money is a necessary good, then 
currency substitution in principle introduces the possibility of a 
perverse reaction to the domestically pursued policy, i.e. one needs 
stronger conditions to rule this out. 
With bond markets in the model we have to make some additional 
assumptions with regard to the bond price elasticities of the 
commodities and currencies, and the cross price elasticities of bonds to 
arrive at the same conclusion; see Appendix B. 
5.2. Flexible Exchange Rates 
The discussion of the flexible exchange rate case again centers 
around the question of what are the specific features of the phenomenon 
of currency substitution. The setting of the ensuing analysis is what we 
term the asymmetric country assumption. To anticipate possible 
misunderstandings, we caution the reader that our definition of 
asymmetry is different from the customary definition. By the asymmetric 
country assumption we will understand that no foreign exchange or 
foreign bonds are held domestically in private portfolios, but that both 
currencies and bonds are held abroad. The domestic country will, in this 
setting, also be referred to as the "large" country, the other country 
is the "small" country. As a motivation for studying this specific case, 
we quote the following passage from Frenkel and Johnson [1976,p.26]: 
"Where the small-country assumption does become relevant is on the 
monetary side of the analysis; concretely, a large country - the United 
States, and to a lesser extent other international financial centres - 
may be able to operate its domestic policies on the assumption that its 
national money is internationally acceptable so that, say, an expansion 
of its domestic credit through a 'cheap money' policy will lead to an 
accumulation of its money in the hands of foreign holders - and 
eventually to world inflation - rather than to a loss of international 
reserves." 
We will illustrate in what sense the phenomenon of currency substitution 
is important against this international background. As an example, we 
discuss the effect of a monetary financed government expenditure 
increase in x upon the exchange rate e. The comparative statics results 
are derived both for the case where the large country pursues this 
policy change and for the case where the small country implements the 
same change. We compare the effects upon e. It turns out that the 
difference is related to the issue of currency substitution. 
We start the analysis with a simplified one-period model. Assume that 
foreigners do hold both currencies, but that domestic residents only 
hold the domestic currency, and that bond markets are absent. In the 
Appendix B we derive the following: 
and 
de (43) - a - %- Nn - P m *  - m*P) + %- ~n - (g-tm)~~ - wm*). 
~ A L  9 9 9 P P 
Equation (42) indicates how the exchange rate e changes due to a 
government expenditure increase upon x, which is financed by printing 
money AMs. Similarly, (43) gives the effect on e when the foreign 
government pursues such a policy. The A's in the expressions denote the 
determinant in the denominator needed in the application of Cramerls 
rule. The determinants in the numerators of (42) and (43) are developed 
with respect to the one row where the two determinants differ; 
the A's with a subscript refer to the relevant cofacters. 
We use a property of the utility function of the individual to 
rewrite ( 4 2 ) .  The property is that m* and l* are in a separate branch of 
the utility tree; see Strotz [1957]. This allows us to write, say, 
Hence, ( 4 2 )  can be expressed as 
To give a heuristic explanation for ( 4 4 ) .  we consider the transaction 
technology example elaborated in section 3.2. From the first-order 
conditions ( 5 )  and ( 6 )  in a one-period model, we have 
Combine this with the specific transaction technology of section 3.2 to 
obtain 
gfl el* T-1 
= 
- *m (-1 1, 
g m* 
or equivalently 
From (47), one easily establishes (44). Moreover, in this case 
Combine (48) and (45), and substitute this into (43). This allows us to 
express (43) as a combination of (42) and some other variables: 
1 
If currency substitution does not prevail abroad either, i.e. foreigners 
do not hold currency m, then (49) would reduce to 
Compare (49) and (50) and note that the difference consists of two 
*m 1 * +  * terms, ( de and +N*. 
8 & M ~  9 e 
Abstract from the latter term by assuming that the employment effect 
is small. Suppose that e rises as a result of the domestic policy, i.e. 
de/dAMS > 0, and that e falls as a result of the foreign policy, i.e. 
de/dALs < 0. This is what is commonly believed to happen as a result of 
such policies; see Mussa [1979]. Moreover, suppose that this would still 
result if currency substitution were absent abroad, i.e. de/dALs in (50) 
is negative too. Let payment habits be such that g*m g*l, i.e. 
foreigners hold m and 1 in about equal amounts (measured in value); see 
(47). 
Given this configuration, it follows that e would appreciate more as 
a result of the foreign policy than e would depreciate as a result of 
the domestic policy. The effect of currency substitution abroad is that 
the small country absorbs part of the money supply increase from the 
large country. Therefore, the "burden of adjustment" does not fall 
completely on the exchange rate. In contrast, if the foreign country 
pursues inflationary financing, the exchange rate has to do all the 
adjustment. This result can be generalized to our two-period model with 
bond markets; see Appendix B, eqn.(B55). One should realize that the 
above conclusion could still follow if currency substitution were 
completely absent. In this case one would have to compare (42) and (50). 
But, it follows immediately from (49) that the possibility of currency 
substitution in the small country certainly adds to the divergence. 
It is tempting to draw the overall conclusion that currency 
substitution can be a matter of both degree'and substance. The foregoing 
discussion shows that the comparative statics results are numerically 
evaluated differently with and without currency substitution. Therefore 
currency substitution is at least a matter of degree. In the previous 
subsection we showed that if money is a necessary good, then it is in 
principle possible that policy impacts have opposite signs in cases with 
and without currency substitution. The result of this subsection is that 
currency substitution causes the wedge between the large country's 
monetary policy impacts on the exchange rate and the small country's 
monetary policy impacts. Thus it seems that currency substitution can be 
a matter of substance too. 
Appendix A 
Domestic Residents O~timization Problem 
Maximize : 
where 
w[.] = PU[.], with 1 > p  > 0, n=n[p,q], and s(.) < t, s9(.) < 0, 
subject to: 
and 
y( j) + m + e(j)1 + rb + e(j)id + e( j)k - fk - g( j) - p( j)x( j) 
- q(j)z(j) - m(j) - e(j)l(j) > 0, for all j = 1#2#...#ns 
and if relevant, the capital market constraint 
Form the Langrangian function to solve this constrained optimization 
problem: 
L = u [ . ]  + ~ n ( j ) w [ . ]  + s { . }  + ~ n ( j ) ~ ( j ) { . }  + 4 { i  - d). 
Next we state the first-order conditions: 
We assume that the different branches of the utility function are 
strictly concave functions; this implies, together with assumption that 
the constraint qualification condition is met, that the above problem 
has a solution. 
Appendix B 
Comparative Statics 
The purpose of this appendix is to derive some of the comparative 
statics results in detail. We start by recapitulating some of the budget 
constraints. With fixed parities, the money supplies of both currencies 
are endogenous because of intervention I by the Exchange Stabilization 
Fund (ESF). The world budget constraint reads in this case: 
The contingent second-period world budget constraints are, under the 
fixed rate regime: 
(B2) p(j)(Esx(j) + Esx*(j)) + q(j)(E8z(j) + Esz*(j)) 
+ (E%(j) + E%(j) + I(j)) + (e(j)ESL(j) + e(j)EsL*(j) - I(j)) = 0, 
for all j states. 
Using Walras'law, the following market equilibrium conditions 
describe the world economy under the fixed exchange rate regime: 
E'X + E"X* = 0, 
E"Z + E ~ Z *  = 0, 
E ~ M  + E ~ M *  + I = 0, 
E"B + E"B* = 0, 
(B3) E"D + E'D* a 0, 
ESx(j) + E~x*(~) = O ,  forallj, 
ESz(j) + ESz*(j) = 0, for all j, 
E"M( j) + Esw(j) + I( j) = 0, for all j. 
This is a system of 5 + 3n equations in the 5 + 3n endogenous variables 
p,q,I,v,w,p( j) ,q( j) and I( j), and n is the number of states of the 
world. Without international bond markets, the excess supply functions 
E'B* and E'D have to be omitted. Without any bond markets, the fourth 
and fifth market equilibrium conditions are abandoned. 
To obtain comparative statics results we need to differentiate 
totally the excess supply system. To permit differentiation of , e.g. 
(B3), we express (B3) in the original macro supply and demand functions 
(B4) 
e X * - $ 2  
x O - m - k x - W X * - 4  
P P P 
e z* 
- Nz - Lz - hx+ Z0 - pz* -4
9 q q 
N(-l)m(-1) .+ AM' - Nm + W(-l)m*(-1) - W m *  + I 
BS - Nb - W b *  
= 0, 
-Nd + DS - W d *  
= 0, 
e( 1 X* e( 1 
xO(j) - N(j)x(j) -&j&j) - P(j)x*(j) -& (j) -JpZ(j) P( j) = 0, y j, 
e(j> z* 
- ~(j)z(j) - . h z ( j )  - L x ( j )  4 j) + zO(j) - ~t(j)z*(j) --mc (j)= 0, y j, 
Upon differentiaton of the excess supply system (B4) one obtains 
where A is the (9311) x (931-1) matrix with elements a representing the i j- 
partial derivatives of the excess supply functions with respect to the 
- 
endogenous variables p p is the vector with macro endogenous j ' 
variables pj as elements; and the vector % contains the partial 
derivatives of the excess supply functions with respect to the exogenous 
variables. We give here some of the elements of A for the reader's 
convenience. The first row elements of A are 
Subscripts indicate with respect to which variable the derivative has 
been taken. The second row is very similar to the first and is not 
stated here; the third row reads 
and the  four th  row is 
A s  the other rows a r e  s imi lar  t o  those s ta ted  above, they a r e  l e f t  to  
the reader. 
I n  the  main t ex t  we a r e  concerned with the  e f f e c t s  of a monetary 
financed subsidy t o  the domestic residents.  For s impl ic i ty  we f i r s t  
consider the  s i t ua t i on  when no bond markets exis t .  Equation (B5) reads 
i n  t h i s  case 
where underlines denote a row vector, overbars indicate column vectors, 
and the capital letters in the matrix are matrices of the order n x n. 
On the right-hand side appear the changes in the exogenous variables 
considered in the main text. By applying Cramer's rule we want to 
establish the direction of change in the endogenous variables caused by 
changes in the exogenous variables, and hence we need to determine the 
signs of several determinants. To obtain those signs we use the 
following theorem, see Quirk and Saposnik [1968, p.1671. 
Theorem. If a real nxn matrix A has a negative diagonal and is 
quasi-dominant-diagonal, then A is totally stable. Moreover, if A is 
totally stable it is a Hicksian matrix, and the sign of its determinant 
can be found, see Quirk and Saposnik [1968,p.166]. 
Under one minor additional assumption, it follows that the diagonal 
elements of the two determinants we need are all positive. Consider for 
example the determinant in the denominator, i.e. the determinant of the 
matrix which appears in (B9). Recall all from (B6). Ruling out Giffen 
goods, it follows that the only negative factor in all is -Npx. We will 
assume that this employment effect upon demand is small compared to the 
output effect and the other demand effects. Similar arguments can be 
given to sign a22 and the diagonal elements of %6(j) and A77(j). 
To give sufficient conditions for the matrices to be quasi-dominant- 
diagonal requires a little more effort. We start with the determinant in 
the denominator. 
From the first-order conditions of the micro optimization problem it 
follows that the demand functions x, z, x(j), z(j) are homogeneous of 
degree zero in the variables u, p, q, u( j), p(j), q(j), 
where u Y + m(-1) + el(-1) - g, and u( j) 3 y(j) - g( j). 
Moreover, the demand functions m, 1, m(j), l(j) are homogenous of degree 
one in these variables. Hence, by Euler's law, 
We make a series of additional assumptions: 
(B11) all goods are normal goods, 
(B12) goods of the same period or state of the world are gross 
substitutes, 
(B13) at least one good of one period or state of the world is a 
gross substitute with a good of another period or state of the 
world. 
Assumptions (B12) and (B13) imply that all cross period goods are gross 
substitutes. The reason is that goods of different periods are in 
different branches of the utility tree; see Strotz [1957]. The above 
three assumptions, together with (BlO), enable us to write 
Note that in any nontrivial case u > m > 0, and that xu =x = -x 
Y go 
Similarly, abroad we have 
where by definition u* = ey* + m*(-1) + el*(-1) - eg*, and u*( j) = 
e(j)y*(j) - e(j)g*(j). Premultiply (B14) and (B15), respectively, by N 
and fl, and add them up to obtain: 
where we have used the notation of (B6) for the last two terms. 
Suppose that the following inequality holds 
Sufficient conditions to conclude that 
are (Bll), (B12), (B13), and (B17). Conditions (Bll), (B12), and (B13) 
are the common normality and gross substitutability assumptions employed 
to guarantee Hicksian stability. However, our short-run model also 
allows for variations in the level of employment and profits due to 
commodity price changes. The effects thereof upon the demand for x are 
captured in the terms on the right-hand side of inequality (B17). 
- Condition (B17) then states that these effects are, in some sense, 
small. 
Under similar sets of conditions the following inequalities can be 
obtained: 
These inequalities, i.e. (B18) - (B21), effectively imply that the 
negative of the matrix appearing in (B9) is totally stable. Therefore, 
the determinant of the matrix in (B9) is positive. 
Next, we turn to the determinant in the numerator. We are interested 
in the effect of a monetary financed subsidy to domestic residents upon 
the intervention activities of the ESF. To establish this, one needs to 
substitute the righthand-side vector in (B9) into the third column of 
t he  mat r ix  i n  (B9) and compute t h e  s i g n  of i ts  determinant.  Inspec t ing  
t h i s  determinant ,  we can aga in  employ i n e q u a l i t i e s  (B18) - (B21), but we 
now need one f o r  t h e  t h i r d  row too before we can e s t a b l i s h  the  quasi- 
dominant-diagonal property.  
Suppose t h a t  s h o r t  term government d e f i c i t s  o r  su rp luses ,  t h a t  a r i s e  
due t o  changes i n  t h e  endogenous v a r i a b l e s ,  a r e  covered by changes i n  
t h e  money supply t o  keep t h e  budget balanced. Hence, Nm  A AM^ can  be g  
expressed d i f f e r e n t l y  a s  N( l+mg)dg + Npgdp. This  fol lows d i r e c t l y  from 
d i f f e r e n t i a t i o n  of t h e  government budget c o n s t r a i n t  (26) ,  given t h a t  GX 
and GZ a r e  kept  cons tan t .  The term N gdp has  t o  be moved t o  t h e  l e f t -  P  
hand s i d e  i n  (B9) before  applying Cramerl s ru le .  The t h i r d  row of t h e  
determinant  i n  t h e  numerator t he re fo re  reads  
Above we no t i ced  t h a t  m is homogeneous of degree one i n  u, p, q,  
u ( j ) ,  p ( j )  and q ( j ) .  Hence, by E u l e r l s  law: 
Reca l l  t h a t  mu -mg. We rewrite (B23) i n t o  e l a s t i c i t y  form: 
where E denotes  a p r i c e  e l a s t i c i t y ,  such as om = &I and rl denotes  an  
P  m P' 
u  income e l a s t i c i t y ,  such as n: = +a . For s i m p l i c i t y ,  we f i r s t  s tudy  t h e  
m u  
case  when f o r e i g n  demand f o r  currency m is absent .  I n  t h i s  s i t u a t i o n  we 
would like to investigate under what conditions the following inequality 
holds : 
Rewrite (B25) into elasticity form: 
N 
where ( denotes the labor demand elasticity (P/N)N~. Using (B241, (B26) P 
will certainly hold if 
(B27) u-m m u + En uj >+; 
and 
(B28) all price elasticities cm are positive and the income 
elasticities nm are positive. 
Thus, it turns out that sufficient conditions for (B26) to hold are that 
money is a gross substitute for all other commodities, it is normal with 
respect to income, and that the employment effects (N are small. With 
P 
foreign demand for currency m present, it is straightforward to show 
that condition (B27) has to be amended, such that the following holds: 
( B29 u-m m m* 
If in addition to (Bll), (B12), (B13) and (B17), assumptions (B27) and 
(B28) or (B29) and (B28) are made, then we can conclude that the 
determinant in the numerator is positive. Hence, I declines as a result 
of the monetary financed subsidy to domestic residents. To recapitulate, 
sufficient conditions for this result are basically that all goods are 
gross substitutes and that short-run employment effects are small. 
Our next task is to establish under which conditions we can arrive at 
the above conclusion if bonds markets do exist. First we investigate the 
quasi-dominant-diagonal property of the matrix appearing in (B5). From 
the micro part it follows that the demand functions x, z, x(j), z( j), b 
and d are homogeneous of degree zero in the variables u, p, q, v, w, 
u( j), p( j), q( j), r and i, where u 3 y + m(-1) + el(-1) + r(-l)b(-1) + 
ei(-l)d(-1) - g and u( j) 3 y( j) -g( j). The demand functions m, 1, m( j), 
l(j) are homogeneous of degree one in the same variables. By Euler's 
law, 
From the micro part one can obtain that 
sign 3 - sign Xr, 
(B31) 
sign 5 3 - sign Xi. 
Moreover, one can show that 
Reasoning along the same lines as we did to obtain (B16), we arrive at 
A sufficient condition for 
to hold, is the following: 
Condition (B35) is very similar to (B17), except that two terms with 
interest effects upon the demand for x had to be added. Similar 
conditions can be derived for the second, sixth, and seventh rows. 
Next, we inspect the fourth row; see (B8). A sufficient condition for 
to hold, is that per country the following inequality is satisfied: 
From the homogeneity of degree zero mentioned earlier we have 
Moreover, b is homogeneous of degree one in u, p, q, u(j), p(j) and 
q(j); i.e. we hold v, w, r and i constant. Thus, 
Hence, substracting (B39) from (B38) 
Combine (B4O) and (B37) into 
or in elasticity form 
It seems plausible to assume that 
Moreover, we will assume 
i.e. the absolute value of the price elasticity with respect to the own 
bondprice exceeds the cross price elasticity with respect to the other 
bondprice. Inequality (B42) implies c: + 1 > cb ; hence we can write i 
the above as 
If (B43) is satisfied in both countries, then (B36) holds. Because it is 
likely that for example sign cb + sign cb condition (B43) does not 
P pj' 
follow directly from the homogeneity property as expressed in (B38). 
This makes (B43) a stronger assumption than the other conditions we gave 
above. In cases where the price elasticities are small compared with the 
one on the left-hand side, then (B43) might be acceptable. At any rate, 
(B43) was the best we could find. 
Finally, we turn to the third row. From the homogeneity properties we 
have 
or, irr elasticity form, 
The question is, under what conditions does the following inequality 
hold : 
or, in elasticity form, 
For simplicity, we discuss here the case when foreigners do not demand 
the domestic currency. Now, (B44) will certainly hold if 
Compare (B45) with (B27). 
The last part of this appendix deals with the flexible rate system. 
We are specifically interested in the asymmetric country assumption: by 
this we mean that no foreign exchange or bonds are held domestically, 
but both currencies and bonds are held abroad. Given these 
circumstances, the first-period world budget constraint reads, using the 
convenient shorthand notation employed earlier, 
The second-period world budget constraints read 
for all j states. Now we invoke Walras' law to eliminate one market per 
period. The following market equilibrium conditions describe a world 
trade equilibrium under the flexible rate regime: 
EsZ + ESZ* a 0, 
E% +ES* = o ,  
E~L* = o ,  
(B48) E'B + E'F = 0, 
E% = 0, 
ESx( j) + E'x*( j) = 0, for all j, 
B'z(~) + EsZ*(j) = 0, for all j, 
ESL*(j) = 0, for all j. 
The above system contains 5 + 3n equations in the 5 + 3n variables p, q, 
e, v, w, p(j>, q(j) and e(j). 
We introduce the following shorthand vector notation (p,q,v,p(j),q(j)) 
= a, (e,w,e(j)) = E ,  and let B denote the vector of all exogenous 
variables. Note that the domestic excess supply functions depend only 
upon a and B, but the foreign excess supply functions depend 
on a, B* and E as well. The reason is our asymmetric country assumption. 
Differentiate the above system totally: 
dB* . 
Suppose that short-term government budget deficits or surpluses that 
arise due to changes in the endogenous variables are covered by changes 
in the bond supply. Domestically this means that the government sets 
8 
vdBS - -gNpdp - B dv; see eqn. (26). The terms -gNp and -BS have to be 
included in IZSBa in (B49). Similarly, abroad the government sets 
ewdDs - -eg*I$de - eg*Wdq - e ~ ~ d w  and the right-hand side terms are 
q 
included in E'? and E'P in (B49). 
We wish to compare the policy effects of domestic or foreign monetary 
financed government expenditure increases in x upon the exchange rate e. 
Below we compute these effects using Cramer's rule: 
(B51) 
A A 
-a de %Mp + + Pm*) -+mq + P m *  + m*W) ++my + y) - 
~ A L ~  P P 4 9 
A A A A 
*mpj + ~ m *  P j ) + Z%N~ s j + rm* s j ) -+m* w + x+mzj, 
where A represents the determinant of the matrix in (B49), and 
the A's with subscripts are the relevant cofactors. The two expressions 
(B50) and (B51) only differ from each other by the second row in the 
determinants in the numerator. The determinants in the numerator have 
been developed with respect to these second rows; therefore the 
cofactors in the two expressions are identical. 
A comparison between de/cIA~' and de/dA~' is facilitated by the 
following. In section 3.1 we observed that the way in which the two 
currencies m and 1 are optimally combined is independent of the 
individual's tastes and his attitudes towards risk. The reasons are that 
m and 1 are in a separate branch of the utility tree, together with the 
fact that the bond markets are perfect. Therefore, we can write 
This implies a string of equalities, 
say. We can now express (B50) as 
Lastly, we write (B51) as a combination of (B50) and some other terms 
For an interpretation of (B55), it pays to consider a simplified 
one-period model. Suppose that the choice problem of foreign agents can 
be formulates as 
(B56) 
el* 
maximize: V" = U. [x*, z*, t-s* {s -
' n '  h*ll, 
subject to: ey* + el*(-1) + m*(-1) -eg* - px* - qz* -el* - m* = 0. 
The choice problem of domestic agents reads 
(B57) 
m 
maximize: u = [x,~, t-s {>h} I, 
subject to: y + m(-1) - g -px -qz - m a 0- 
The asymmetric country assumption is reflected by the fact that only 
foreign agents hold both currencies. Note that the demand for both 
currencies abroad is determinate, as long as m* and l* are not perfect 
substitutes in the sense discussed above. The world budget constraint is 
found to be 
or, in terms of the notation employed before, 
By Walras's law, the following market equilibrium conditions completely 
characterize a world trade equilibrium: 
There are three equations in (B60) in the three varaibles p,q, and 
e. Suppose that short term government surpluses or deficits due to 
changes in the endogenous variables are covered by changes in the money 
supply. Thus, the government sets  AM') = - gN dp. Bearing this in 
P 
mind, differentiate (B60) totally 
We wish to consider, as before, the effects of monetary financed 
increases in government expenditures in x upon e. More precisely, consider 
dGX =  AM' + gNpdp and dGX* - dAls + g*N"dq + g*2de. Computation by Q 
Cramer's rule gives 
and 
(B63) de A - = - - - Pm* - m*NLq) + *-Nmp-(g+m)~p - Wm*) . 
~AL' 4 4 P 
From the first-order conditions for the optimization problem (B56) it is 
straightforward to show that Strotz' proposition holds, i.e. ,we have 
say. Hence, (B62) can be written as 
Combine (B65) and (B63) into 
To be even more specific, consider the transaction technology example 
elaborated in section 3.2. From the first-order conditions for (B56) one 
finds 
( B67 '*el*/n = - )  *' e l*  = 1 ,  




(B68) *m *1 1-T m * = ( g  /g ) el*. 
In this  case, 4 defined above in .  (B64) is given by 
Hence, de/d~L' in (B66) can be Written a8 
Glossarv of Mathematical Svmbols 
In general capital letters refer to macro variables and lower case 
letters refer to micro variables. First the Latin letters are given, 
followed by the Greek letters. Some other symbols are given at the end. 
A s  %j = matrix and submatrix of the totally differentiated 
excess supply system 
= matrix elements 
= matrix column 
= matrix row 
= exchange rate risk premium 
= vector of the totally differentiated excess supply 
system 
= domestic demand for domestic treasury notes at times 
t-1 and t 
= total supply of domestic treasury notes at time t 
= argument of the transaction technology 
= total supply of foreign treasury notes at time t 
= domestic demand for foreign treasury notes at times 
t-1 and t 
= quota on domestic holdings of foreign treasury notes 
= the exchange rate at times t and t+l 
= excess supply function; for example, E'X indicates 
the domestic excess supply of x 
= forward rate at time t for t+l 
= macro production function of x 
= government taxes if positive (or subsidies when 
negative) at times t and t+l 
GX, GZ = governement expenditures on x and z 
grn9 g1 = gravity variables 
h = habits of invoicing and paying 
i(-1)-1, i-1 = foreign interest rate at times t-1 and t 
= intervention by the Exchange Stabilization Fund 
(ESF); when negative it indicates that the ESF buys 
currency m 
= identity matrix of order nxn 
= state of the world at time t+l, j=1,2,...,n 
= amount of forward purchases of the foreign currency 
contracted at time t for time t+l 
K = amount of fixed captial 
1 - 1 ,  1 1 = domestic demand for the foreign currency at times 
t-1, t, and t+1 
L = the Langrangian in the micro part 
L = total domestic demand for 1 in the macro part 
AL' = change in the foreign money supply 
M = total domestic demand for m 
m - 1 ,  m, m j  = domestic demand for the domestic currency at times t- 
1, t and t+l 
 AM^ = change in the domestic currency supply 
n = price index, which is a function of prices p and q 
N = the number of employed 
0 = convexity term 
PS ~ ( j )  = domestic price of x at times t and t+1 
vector of macro endogenous variables 
px, pZ = profits, where the superscript refers to the relevant 
industry 
4, 4(j) = domestic price of z at times t and t+l 
r - - 1  1 = domestic interest rate at times t-1 and t 
s = time involved in completing transact ions 
= time constraint to the individual after deleting the 
amount of hours worked 
= first-period branch of the utility function 
= leisure time in micro part 
= wealth in macro part 
= domestic bond premium 
= utility function, which is additively separable over 
time 
= second-period branch of the utility function 
= foreign bond premium 
= domestic demand for commodity x at times t and t-tl 
= domestic total output of x 
= fixed nominal wage rate 
= domestic demand for commodity z at times t and t+l 
= foreign total output of z 
= coefficient in gravity equation in the micro part 
= price vector in macro part 
= vector of all exogenous variables 
= determinant; and when A carries a subscript it 
denotes a cofactor 
= price vector 
= with subscripts and superscripts it denotes a price 
elasticity 
= income elasticity 
= Lagrangian multiplier 
= Lagrangian multiplier 
= subjective probability measure indicating the chance 
that state j will occur 
= pure rate of time preference of the individual 
= elasticity of currency substitution 
= coefficient of transaction technology 
= Lagrangian multiplier in micro part 
= employment elasticity in macropart 
= ratio of partial derivatives 
= overbars denote column vectors, underlines indicate 
row vectors in the macro part 
= for all 
= absolute value sign 
= superscript indicating foreign variables 
= time indicator for the previous period 
= time indicator for the coming period 
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